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The Inverted Fisher Hypothesis: 
Inflation Forecastability and Asset Substitution
WOON GYU CHOI*
This paper examines the implications of inflation persistence for the inverted
Fisher hypothesis that nominal interest rates do not adjust to inflation because of
a high degree of substitutability between money and bonds. It is emphasized that
the substitutability between nominal assets and capital renders the hypothesis
inconsistent with the data when inflation persistence is high. Using a switching
regression model, the analysis allows the reflection of inflation in interest rates to
vary according to the degree of inflation persistence or forecastability. The
hypothesis is supported by U.S. data only when inflation forecastability is below a
certain threshold. [JEL C51, E43]
T
his paper examines the implications of inflation persistence for the inverted
Fisher hypothesis (IFH) proposed by Carmichael and Stebbing (1983) (here-
inafter referred to as Carmichael and Stebbing). The standard Fisher hypothesis
implies that the real interest rate is not affected by inflation because of the substi-
tutability between bonds and capital. In contrast, Carmichael and Stebbing argue
that this hypothesis becomes inverted if there is a high substitutability between
money and bonds and if government regulation precludes the payment of interest
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with the real interest rate moving inversely one-for-one with inflation.
Presupposing that the inflation process is stationary (that is, nonpersistent),
Carmichael and Stebbing deemphasize the potential substitutability between
nominal assets (money and bonds) and capital, but this substitutability matters
when the inflation process is highly persistent (that is, realized inflation is infor-
mative in predicting future inflation). As a result, the IFH is likely to be supported
only when the inflation process is stationary. Carmichael and Stebbing conjecture
that the hypothesis is expected to hold only in countries with moderate or low
inflation. Also, Barth and Bradley (1988) attribute the failure of the hypothesis in
samples extending beyond 1978 to its crucial dependence on the assumption of
moderate inflation.
A plausible interpretation of Carmichael and Stebbing’s conjecture is that
agents are more concerned about substitutions between money and capital when
inflation is high than otherwise, since changes in inflation are usually sizable and
thus have important consequences for the return on money. In this case, higher
inflation should be associated with less reflection of inflation in real interest rates.
This interpretation relies on asset substitutability varying across inflation levels. In
contrast, if substitutability among assets is constant, the failure of the IFH is
attributable to the effect of inflation persistence on asset substitutions. This paper
suggests that if inflation is persistent, and thus a direction or trend in future infla-
tion is largely anticipated, changes in inflation lead to asset substitutions. Thus,
higher inflation persistence should be associated with less reflection of inflation in
real interest rates. 
Despite evidence on the persistence of inflation in the post–World War II
period (for example, Klein, 1975; and Evans and Wachtel, 1993), no previous
studies have explicitly taken into account the influence of inflation persistence in
testing the IFH. This paper sheds light on the link between inflation persistence
and the effect of asset substitutions on interest rates. Studies of hyperinflations and
other rapid inflations (for example, Laidler, 1993) suggest that expected inflation
affects money holdings. Although most economies do not have such high inflation,
many do experience highly persistent inflation over a substantial length of time. If
inflation is highly persistent, economic agents can largely forecast inflation using
their recent experience. When higher inflation is expected, agents will substitute
capital for nominal assets. The resulting decrease in real balances alters the
implicit marginal return on money, which Carmichael and Stebbing, however,
assumed to be approximately constant.
The more persistent the inflation rate, the higher its short-term forecastability
becomes. Changes in the monetary regime affect the persistence of inflation and
thus its forecastability. Friedman (1977) views regime changes as an important
source of inflation uncertainty. Klein (1975) provides an appealing explanation,
subsequently emphasized by Friedman and Schwartz (1982, chapter 10), of how
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1Carmichael and Stebbing argue that one should take into account the substitutability between money
and bonds in determining the effect of inflation on interest rates, especially because the data mainly










































*inflation forecastability is influenced by fundamental changes in the character of
the monetary system. Klein argues that with the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system and the explicit step toward a fiat money system in the 1970s, changes in
institutional arrangements made inflation more predictable in the short term than
it had been earlier.2
In a similar vein, Flood and Mussa (1994) emphasize the influence of mone-
tary regimes on the behavior of prices and inflation as follows. Prices under the
gold standard had a tendency to return to a normal level. With the widespread
acceptance of paper money standard after World War II, however, price levels no
longer have a tendency to revert to a norm, as is shown in Figure 1. They attribute
a noticeable downturn of inflation during the 1980s, which follows an upsurge of
inflation beginning in the late 1960s and extending into the 1970s, partly to the
shift in policy. They argue that the “well-managed” paper money standard is likely
to deliver a low rate of inflation. Also, a shift in emphasis on whether monetary
policy targets money growth, interest rates, or inflation results in changes in the
Woon Gyu Choi
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2Klein argues that, under specie standards that provided an anchor for the price level, there was
considerable short-term unpredictability, but much less long-term unpredictability, of inflation. Under the
fiduciary monetary system of the post–World War II period, there is no anchor for the price level. Agents
have come to regard prices as largely affected by policy, and short-term unpredictability is less than
before. For example, Hutchison and Keeley (1989) show that inflation evolved from a white noise process
in the pre–World War I period to a highly persistent, nonstationary process in the post-1960 period, which
strengthened the Fisher effect.







Figure 1. U.S. Price Level, 1800–1992
(logarithm price level, 1950=ln(100))
Source: Flood and Mussa (1994).THE INVERTED FISHER HYPOTHESIS
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inflation process (see Rudebusch and Svensson, 1998). With the anti-inflationary
policy by U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker and subsequent steady
policies, U.S. inflation has become lower and less persistent since the mid-1980s
than before.
Rather than restricting the IFH by using a chronological time scale, we
propose that the IFH holds only when inflation forecastability is below a threshold
value. To test whether the validity of the IFH depends on regimes, we estimate
switching regressions that allow the reflection of inflation in interest rates to vary
over regimes. Two regimes are assumed to be distinguishable according to
whether inflation forecastability is below or above a threshold estimate. To
measure inflation forecastability, we estimate an inflation equation that incorpo-
rates an autoregressive (AR) process, reflecting a backward-looking nature, along
with the short-term interest rate that carries information about future inflation,
reflecting a forward-looking nature. Thus, the inflation equation is based on the
efficient use of available information as in Nelson and Schwert (1977), consistent
with rational expectations. As the inflation process can involve structural shifts
unknown to agents ex ante, we use a rolling estimation of the inflation equation,
taking into account the role of learning for such shifts.
Carmichael and Stebbing tested the IFH by regressing the actual real interest
rate on the actual inflation. This testing procedure does not require the use of arbi-
trary data about inflation expectation and does not involve, under the IFH, an
errors-in-variables problem that makes estimates inconsistent owing to measure-
ment error on the regressor. In this paper, two schemes are considered for
switching between regimes. First, a switching regression with a smooth transition
is used to reflect the notion that agents assign different weights to possible regimes
according to their judgments, with time-varying confidence, about the inflation
process. This scheme somewhat controls the errors-in-variables problem in testing
the IFH under alternative regimes. Second, a switching regression with perfect
discrimination is used to treat two regimes separately. This scheme is immune to
the errors-in-variables problem in testing the IFH. 
Linearity testing supports the evidence for the threshold effect in the
Carmichael and Stebbing equation. This paper finds new evidence that the IFH is
supported by U.S. data only when inflation forecastability is below a certain (esti-
mated) threshold. This finding is consistent with the argument that the implicit
marginal return on money and the nominal interest rate adjust to inflation through
substitution between nominal assets and capital in periods of persistent inflation,
but they do not adjust to inflation when inflation is nonpersistent and thus largely
unpredictable.
I. Conceptual Background and the Model
The IFH is based on the premise that optimizing agents hold money and financial
assets up to the point at which their after-tax real yields are equal. The after-tax
real rate of return on a bill is given by 
(1) ri Nt Nt t =− + π 1,where iNt, the after-tax nominal rate, is defined as iNt =( 1 –θ t)it with the marginal
tax rate, θ t, and π t+1 denotes inflation at the maturity of the bill. The after-tax real
return on money is given by rmt = zt – π t+1, where zt is the implicit marginal return
on money. In equilibrium, rNt = rmt, therefore, rNt = zt – π t+1 or, equivalently,
zt = iNt. Assuming a close substitutability between money and financial assets,
Carmichael and Stebbing argue that zt is approximately constant.
Taking (conditional) expectations of equation (1) on both sides,
(1′ )
where E is the expectations operator conditional on the information set available in
period t. Carmichael and Stebbing assume that expectations are unbiased—that is,
(2)
where ε t+1 is a mean-zero random error. Also, the after-tax nominal interest rate is
assumed to be known at all points in time—that is, E(iNt)=iNt.
To test the IFH, Carmichael and Stebbing present the following equation:
(3)
where α 0 is a constant, and ξ t is a mean-zero random error and independent of ε t+1.
Under the IFH, E(rNt) moves inversely one for one with E(π t+1)—that is, α ′2 = –1.
Thus, the IFH implies that iNt = α 0 + ξ t, suggesting that the nominal rate should be
independent of both E(π t+1) and π t+1.3 Substituting equations (1) and (1′ ) into equa-
tion (3) and eliminating E(π t+1) using equation (2), Carmichael and Stebbing obtain
in the testable form
(3′ )
Under the null hypothesis α ′2 = –1,4 an errors-in-variables problem in equation
(3′ ) vanishes. The Carmichael and Stebbing estimation avoids the use of arbitrary
data on inflation expectations in determining the effect of inflation on interest
rates. This procedure cannot be used to test the standard Fisher hypothesis because
of an errors-in-variables problem (see Graham, 1988).
If inflation is close to a martingale difference sequence with respect to the
agents’information set (that is, if the conditional expectation of inflation based on
the available information set is almost the same as the unconditional expectation
of inflation), there is little persistence in inflation. As such, current changes in
rNt t t t =+ ′ +−+ ′ ( ) ++ αα π ξ α ε 02 1 2 1 1.
Er E Nt t t ( ) =+ ′ ( ) + + ααπ ξ 02 1 ,
ππ ε tt t E ++ + = ( ) + 11 1 ,
Er Ei E Nt Nt t ( ) = ( ) − ( ) + π 1 ,
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3Estimating the nominal rate equation to test the IFH should account for the nominal rate response to
E(π t+1), which involves the use of arbitrary data about expected inflation. Nonetheless, one can check whether
the nominal rate is independent of actual inflation (see, for the result of this test, the robustness check section). 
4Gallagher (1986) points out that this testing pertains to the maintained hypothesis that (π t+1) and ξ t
are only contemporaneously uncorrelated. Following earlier studies including Carmichael and Stebbing,
this study interprets the IFH as claiming that inflation and nominal interest rates are contemporaneously
uncorrelated in the sense of Gallagher.inflation have little effect on agents’ expectations of future inflation and thus on
the substitution between nominal assets and capital. This would fit Carmichael and
Stebbing’s presumed environment. However, their proposition is consistent with
the principles of rational agents only when inflation persistence is low enough. If
inflation is highly persistent, substitution between nominal assets and capital
occurs when the inflation rate changes.
Now the real rate response to inflation is allowed to vary with inflation persis-
tence. Two regimes are classified according to whether inflation persistence, ρ
π
t,i s
below or above a threshold, τ . If the two regimes are perfectly discriminated, then
define Dt = 0 if ρ
π
t ≤τ and Dt = 1 otherwise, where τ is a fixed parameter. Two
equations are set up. The first equation states that the implicit marginal return on
money is negatively related to real balances:
(4)
This notion is consistent with the money-in-utility function (MIUF) approach in a
monetary general equilibrium framework (Danthine and Donaldson, 1986; Lucas,
2000; Walsh, 1998; and Choi and Oh, forthcoming), which suggests diminishing
marginal utility gains from holding real balances. Another equation presents the




where Yt denotes real output and π
e
t+1 represents the expected nominal rate of
return on real assets. That is, the demand for real balances increases with real
output but decreases with returns on bonds and real assets. Equation (5) introduces
a portfolio shift with a threshold effect owing to shifts in the inflation process in
the conventional money-demand function that is consistent with the MIUF
approach and Friedman and Schwartz’s (1982, pp. 37–40) money-demand func-
tion. The π
e
t+1 term appears when inflation is persistent (Dt = 1), so that expected
inflation is reflected in the nominal rate of return; otherwise it does not affect
money holdings as in the Carmichael and Stebbing setting.
In equilibrium, M
d
t =M t and zt = Λ (Mt/Pt). For any π
e
t+1, there is an equilib-
rium value for Mt/Pt and, hence, for zt. When π is highly persistent, if agents
expect future π to rise, they will hold less money and more capital. With this
substitution, zt rises and, hence, iNt rises too. Conversely, when inflation persis-
tence is low, agents, who are not expecting π to change in a certain direction, will
not alter their money holdings. As a result, both zt and iNt will be unchanged.
The next step is to set out an augmented version of equation (3′ ) as 
(6a)
(6b) rNt t t t t =+ ′ +− + ′ ( ) > ++ αγ π ξ γ ε ρτ π
02 12 21 1              if   .
rNt t t t t =+ ′ +− + ′ ( ) ≤ ++ αα π ξ α ε ρτ π
02 1 1 2 1 1              if   ,
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217Premultiplying equation (6a) by (1 – Dt), equation (6b) by Dt, and adding yields
(7)





2), respectively. This regime-wide heteroskedasticity assump-
tion reconciles the evidence from Hamilton (1988) and Choi (1999a) that the
interest rate process involves heteroskedastic error.5 In contrast with Carmichael
and Stebbing’s IFH (α ′2 =γ ′2 =–1), it is argued that α ′2 = –1 holds but γ ′2 =–1 does
not. It is expected that γ ′2>–1 because asset substitutions under the high-persistence
regime raise the nominal rate response to inflation.
So far this study has considered how inflation forecastability affects the link
between interest rates and inflation, on the presumption that substitutability
among assets is fixed. From a different viewpoint, supposing that asset substi-
tutability is positively correlated with inflation, we can also test Carmichael and
Stebbing’s conjecture that the IFH is expected to hold only when inflation is low
by replacing the forecastability index with the level of inflation. 
II. Empirical Methodology
To make estimating equation (7) tractable, we incorporate “deterministic
switching based on other variables” as proposed by Goldfeld and Quandt (1972,
pp. 258–77; 1973). First, we estimate an inflation forecast model includes lags of
the dependent variable and the nominal interest rate, it, as a predictor of future
inflation (Nelson and Schwert, 1977)
(8)
Note that the IFH implies no response of nominal rates to inflation so that λ=0
under the IFH, whereas the Fisher effect implies that λ≠0 . To account for struc-
tural changes in the inflation process (through shifts in parameters b’s and λ) and
to reflect the idea that agents learn about the inflation process by looking back
over their recent experience, inflation forecast errors are computed from the
rolling estimation of the model. The rolling regression is preferred to an entire-
period regression, because the latter would provide forecasts based on information
that agents would not have had unless the model parameters were constant.
Second, as a proxy for ρ π
t, we use the inflation forecastability index, Ft, which
is defined as the rolling-weighted R2 of the inflation forecast regression6
ππ λ ε ti
i
k
ti t t bb i +
=
−+ =+ ++ ∑ 10
1
1.
rD DD D Nt t t t t t t t t =+ − ( ) ′ + ′ +− ( ) + ++ αα π γ π η η 02 1 2 1 1 2 11 ,
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5Switching model (7) assumes heteroskedasticity across regimes but homoskedasticity within a
regime, whereas a model of GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity,
Bollerslev, 1986) (with regime shifts) allows for autocorrelation in the second moment of errors, implying
history-dependent variability in errors.
6As inflation moves more persistently, it can be better forecast using the past history of inflation.
Autocorrelations up to several orders of the residual, which contain information about persistence, will be
reflected in this index. In general, agents would utilize indicators for future inflation, too.(9)
where εˆt–i (for i = 0,1,...,w–1) is the inflation forecast error of the rolling regres-
sion with window size w, π–
t = 1 – wΣ
w–1
i=0π t+1–i, and h is a weight parameter. Notice
that Ft is negatively related to the ratio of the variance of unanticipated inflation
(that is, the conditional variance of inflation) to the variance of inflation. If infla-
tion is highly persistent, the variance of inflation far outweighs that of unantici-
pated inflation—that is, the value of Ft becomes high. 
Third, we define the standardized unobservable  switching index as
F*
t = F ˜
t + ν t, where F ˜
t is the standardized Ft and ν t is an identically and indepen-
dently distributed (i.i.d.) drawing from N(0,1) and is assumed to be independent
of η 1t and η 2t. Also, using the switching index, the indicator function can be
approximated by a continuous function
(10)
This smoothing function allocates weights to observations according to forecasta-
bility and in effect allows for a continuum of states between two extreme regimes.7
Thus, the smoothing function reflects the fact that agents, learning from their recent
experience, assign different weights to the two regimes based on their judgment,
with time-varying confidence, about the inflation process. The log-likelihood func-
tion for equation (7) up to a constant term is given by
(11)
Substituting equation (10) into equation (11), a maximum-likelihood estimation
(MLE) can be made by maximizing the log-likelihood function with respect to α 0,
α ′2, γ ′2, σ 1, σ 2, and τ .
To determine whether the threshold effect is statistically significant, we
conduct the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for linearity, following a procedure
suggested by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993). The procedure is described in
Appendix I. Since the threshold parameter is unknown a priori and not identified
under the null hypothesis of linearity (α ′2–γ ′2=0), classical tests have nonstandard
distributions. This is the so-called Davies problem (Davies, 1987). Following
Hansen (1996), three types of final statistics that are functionals of the collection
of LM test statistics over the grid set are computed: the supremum (SupLM), the
average (AveLM), and the exponential average (ExpLM) of all LM statistics.8
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7Observations with moderate forecastability may be grouped between the two extreme regimes. The
smooth transition treats these observations as a mix of the two regimes, weighted by the distance from
each. Thereby the degree to which inflation is reflected in interest rates is a monotonic function of infla-
tion persistence.
8Davies (1987) and Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) suggest using the supremum of statistics over a grid set,
whereas Andrews and Ploberger (1994) suggest using the average and the exponential average of statistics.The grid set is composed of 101 grids that evenly divide the range from the 10th
to the 90th percentile of the empirical distribution of the (standardized) switching
index. Their significance levels are calculated using a simulated empirical distri-
bution of these statistics. 
Testing either α ′2 = –1 or γ ′2 = –1 in equation (7) may involve a measurement-
error problem. That is, a correlation remains between the regressor and the error
term under the null hypothesis of α ′2 =–1 or of γ ′2 =–1 if the two regimes are imper-
fectly discriminated (0< Dt<1). To deal with the errors-in-variables problem in the
testing, we first test H0(α ′2 =γ ′2 =–1) and then H0(γ ′2 =–1|α ′2 =–1), assuming that
the IFH holds under the low-forecastability regime. Both hypotheses should not be
rejected if Carmichael and Stebbing’s IFH holds.  
Next, to test either α ′2 = –1 or γ ′2 = –1 separately under the assumption of
perfect discrimination, we estimate a piecewise linear regression for equation (7),
setting Dt=0 if F ˜
t≤τ , and Dt=1 otherwise. This testing procedure is robust to the
errors-in-variables problem because the estimator under different regimes uses
mutually exclusive observations. Estimating this threshold model should account
for the Davies problem, as τ is not identified under the null hypothesis of no
threshold effect.
This study tests the IFH under alternative regimes, controlling the nuisance
parameter problem in the context of Hansen (1999, 2000); see also Appendix II.
First, we estimate the threshold model by weighted least squares (WLS) to control
heteroskedastic errors and obtain a consistent estimate for τ by minimizing the
sum of squared residuals over a grid set.  Second, we perform the likelihood-ratio
test for α ′2 = γ ′2 using p-values constructed from a bootstrap procedure. Third, we
form the confidence interval for τ by forming the no-rejection region using the
likelihood-ratio statistic for tests on τ . Finally, as in Hansen (1999), we make an
inference about the slope estimate as if the threshold estimate were the true value,
since Chan (1993) and Hansen (2000) show that the dependence on the threshold
estimate is not of first-order asymptotic importance.
III. Empirical Results
Measuring Variables
This study uses the U.S. time-series data taken from Federal Reserve Economic
Data  (FRED) over the period from January 1947 (1947:01) to 1997:12. The three-
month treasury bill rate is used as the nominal interest rate. To measure inflation,
the study uses the consumer price index (CPI) with no adjustment for housing costs
for the whole period or, alternatively, the implicit price deflator for personal
consumption expenditure (PPC) from 1959:01 to 1997:12.9 In keeping with earlier
studies on the IFH, we estimate a quarterly model to match the maturity of treasury
Woon Gyu Choi
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9Using the mnemonics on the FRED of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the variable defini-
tions are TB3MS (the three-month treasury bill rate), CPIAUSL (the CPI-U: whole items), and
PCE/PCEC92 (the personal consumption expenditure deflator). The average for each quarter is used to
measure the quarterly series. All except interest rates are seasonally adjusted data. bills, although both interest and inflation rates are available monthly.10 The infla-
tion rate in period t is defined as π t ≡ 400(Pt/Pt–1 –1), where Pt is the price level
in period t. To account for the tax effect on interest rates (Darby, 1975; and
Feldstein, 1976), we assume that the marginal tax rate on interest income is fixed
at 0.3, following Evans and Lewis (1995). For comparison purposes, we also use
Sahasakul’s (1986) marginal tax rate data. 
Figure 2 depicts the tax-adjusted (ex post) real rate of return on three-month
treasury bills and the CPI inflation rate at the maturity of the bill. It is quite
discernible that inflation was rather persistent in the late 1960s, and high and
highly persistent from the 1973 oil shock until 1981. Paul Volcker’s anti-inflation
policy kept inflation in check in 1982 and, thereafter, policy has consistently
aimed at keeping inflation low. The real rate dipped in the 1970s but changed in
the opposite direction by less than one for one with inflation. The downward
movement in inflation and financial deregulation in the early 1980s resulted in
increases in cash and interest-earning deposits. This may have led to a sharp rise
in the real rate and a decrease in the implicit marginal return on money. After the
mid-1980s, the movement in the real rate became quite steady.
THE INVERTED FISHER HYPOTHESIS
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10The use of a monthly model may cause serial correlation in errors because the maturity of yield on
a bill is longer than the data frequency. Suppose that the error term of equation (3′ ) (in a difference form)
for the one-month rate is serially uncorrelated. Based on this equation, the monthly model of the three-
month rate can be expressed—for example, via the expectations hypothesis. Time aggregation results in
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Figure 2. Short-Term Real Interest Rates and Inflation, 1953:Q2–1997:Q4
(percent)The forecastability index is measured by the quarterly average of a monthly
forecastability index to capture the variability of inflation within a quarter.
Inflation forecast errors are computed from the rolling estimation of a monthly
inflation model (w = 60), which includes nine lags of the dependent variable and
the nominal interest rate as a predictor of future inflation.11 Figure 3 shows the
rolling estimates of Σ
9
i=1bi and λover time in equation (8): inflation persistence
and forecastability can be positively related to Σ
9
i=1bi and also to λ, because infor-
mation about future inflations is more likely to be reflected in the nominal rate
with a higher inflation persistence; the predictive power of the interest rate in
regressions, however, tends to complement that of lagged inflation rates. The
monthly forecastability index is then measured by equation (9) by setting h = 0.9
for the CPI (h = 0.98 for the PPC); when the CPI is used, the most recent year
accounts for the 72 percent of the weight given to all observations within each
window (the corresponding figure is 31 percent for the PPC). For comparison
purposes, the switching variable is alternatively defined as the lagged quarterly
inflation rate.
Figure 4 displays the standardized inflation forecastability index (F ˜
t) along
with the smoothing function (Dt) given the τ estimate (reported in Table 3
below). The indices for both the CPI and the PPC show relatively high values,
particularly in the late 1960s, for a few years after the first (1973–74) oil shock,
and during 1979–86. These were mostly periods of relatively high and persistent
inflation; the indices show quite low values in most periods after 1986.
Movements in the real interest rate, inflation, and the forecastability index
suggest that the IFH can hardly be reconciled with the data during persistent
inflationary eras.
This study uses first differences of the variables to test the IFH, following
Carmichael and Stebbing (1983), Barth and Bradley (1988), and Gupta (1991),
since estimating the level-form equation involves the use of nonstationary time
series. The first-difference-form regression does not include an intercept unless
indicated; regressions with the intercept provide almost identical results. The
starting date of regressions with the CPI is 1953:Q2 (second quarter of 1953),
whereas that of regressions with the PPC is either 1959:Q3 or 1965:Q2, depending
upon the starting date of the switching index. The ending date of the regressions
is either 1997:Q3 or 1982:Q4, depending upon the availability of Sahasakul’s tax
rate data.
Carmichael and Stebbing Regressions and Linearity Testing
To begin with, the single-regime Carmichael and Stebbing regression for equation
(3′ ) is estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method for the period
1953:Q2–1997:Q3 when the CPI is used (1959:Q3–1997:Q3 when the PPC is
used). Table 1 summarizes the results. Despite the difference in the sample
periods, the results with a constant marginal tax rate are virtually the same as those
Woon Gyu Choi
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11Different lag lengths are suggested by different information criteria (over rolling samples). However,
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Figure 3. Rolling Estimates of Inflation Forecasting Regression, 1953:01–1998:12
Notes: The top two (bottom two) panels pertain to the inflation equation using CPI (PPC). Thin lines
represent two-standard-error bands.with a time-varying tax rate.12 The IFH (α ′2 =–1) is rejected at the 5 percent signif-
icance level in all cases. For example, with a constant marginal tax rate adjust-
ment, the α ′2 estimate is –0.896 with the CPI (–0.931 with the PPC). The null
hypothesis of α ′2 = –1 is rejected by the Wald test at the 5 percent level, although
it is less strongly rejected in the PPC case. The LM tests for the null hypothesis of
homoskedastic errors against an alternative specification in which the variance of
residuals depends on the lagged nominal rate (as in Marsh and Rosenfeld, 1983,
and Hamilton, 1988) provide strong evidence against homoskedasticity. The
Carmichael and Stebbing equation estimated by WLS to account for such
heteroskedasticity (bottom panel) also provides evidence against the IFH. 
Next, linearity testing is performed to determine whether there exists a
threshold effect. Table 2 reports the test results assuming a constant marginal tax
rate. The top panel reports results with the forecastability index as the switching
variable, and the bottom panel reports results with the lagged inflation level.
Errors are assumed to be either homoskedastic (upper row) or heteroskedastic



























Dt (τ f = –0.073)
Dt (τ f = 0.392)
Figure 4. Standardized Forecastability Index and Smoothing Function Values,
1953:Q2–1997:Q4
12Barth and Bradley (1988) and Gupta (1991) find that estimation results for equation (3′ ) are not sensi-
tive to whether or not the real rate is adjusted for taxes. Indeed, as Barth and Bradley point out, “since taxes
are levied on the nominal rate, irrespective of tax adjustments, the real interest rate should vary inversely and
one-for-one with the inflation rate (under the hypothesis),” unless the tax rate is correlated with inflation.THE INVERTED FISHER HYPOTHESIS
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Table 1. Single-Regime Regressions
Constant Marginal Tax Rate1 Time-Varying Marginal Tax Rate1
CPI PPC CPI PPC
Parameter (53:Q2–97:Q3) (65:Q2–97:Q3)2 (53:Q2–82:Q4) (65:Q2–82:Q4)2
OLS
α ′2 –0.896 (0.037)**  –0.933 (0.045)** –0.853 (0.044)** –0.872 (0.070)**
R –2/D-W 0.89 / 1.72 0.79 / 1.67 0.88 / 1.89 0.73 / 1.84
LM(1)3 9.37 (0.002) 6.61 (0.010) 8.48 (0.004) 5.40 (0.020)
WLS
α ′2 –0.928 (0.021)**  –0.957 (0.033)** –0.905 (0.027)** –0.904 (0.056)**
R –2/D-W 0.92 / 1.54 0.84 / 1.57 0.91 / 1.65 0.78 / 1.71
Notes: The results of estimating equation (3) in first-difference form. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) for the OLS estimator are based on White’s correction for heteroskedasticity. The WLS esti-
mator is based on the weight that equals the square root of the lagged nominal interest rate. The
superscript ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. D-W denotes the Durbin-Watson statistic.
1For the tax-adjusted interest rate, a constant average marginal tax rate (θ = 0.3) is assumed in
the first and second columns, and the average marginal tax rate (θ t) from Sahasakul (1986) is used
in the third and fourth columns.
2The starting date is set the same as those for switching regressions with the forecastability index.
3Lagrange multiplier statistic for the null hypothesis that the variance of residuals depends on
the lagged nominal interest rate (p-values are in parentheses).
Table 2. Tests for Linearity
Test Statistic
Switching Variable SupLM AveLM ExpLM LM(τˆf)3
Forecastability index1
CPI 6.81 (0.012)2 6.05 (0.005) 3.08 (0.006) 6.26 (0.012)
(53:Q2–97:Q3) 6.26 (0.045) 5.35 (0.024) 2.73 (0.028) 5.31 (0.021)
PPC 3.06 (0.148) 2.75 (0.086) 1.39 (0.095) 3.00 (0.083)
(65:Q2–97:Q3) 2.95 (0.158) 2.66 (0.097) 1.34 (0.106) 2.93 (0.087)
Inflation level
CPI 14.78 (0.000) 13.75 (0.000) 7.03 (0.000) 15.11 (0.000)
(53:Q2–97:Q3) 14.50 (0.000) 12.46 (0.000) 6.56 (0.000) 13.39 (0.000)
PPC 7.53 (0.011) 5.38 (0.016) 2.91 (0.013) 5.04 (0.019)
(59:Q3–97:Q3) 7.54 (0.015) 5.01 (0.017) 2.79 (0.017) 5.04 (0.025)
Notes: Regressions are in first-difference form, assuming θ = 0.3. 
1Measured from the monthly inflation forecast model that includes nine lags of the dependent
variable and the three-month treasury bill rate (two-period-lagged monthly figures).
2Figures in the upper row (lower row) for each statistic are based on the homoskedasticity
(heteroskedasticity) assumption. The asymptotic p-values (in parentheses) for SupLM, AveLM, and
ExpLM are computed from simulations (J = 1,000) over the grid set (#Γ = 102). 
3The statistic follows a χ 2(1) distribution under the null hypothesis that the coefficient on infla-
tion is constant across the subsamples grouped by τˆ, obtained from the joint estimation of equations
(7) and (9) by MLE.to depend on the lagged nominal rate. Since the p-values for the test statistics tend
to be higher under the heteroskedasticity assumption, one can conservatively
decide, based on those p-values, whether linearity is rejected.
All the test statistics—SupLM, AveLM, and ExpLM—indicate that linearity
is strongly rejected in most cases except for the case of the PPC with the fore-
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Table 3. Switching Regressions with Smooth Transitions
Constant Marginal Tax Rate1 Time-Varying Marginal Tax Rate1
CPI PPC CPI PPC
Parameter (53:Q2–97:Q3) (65:Q2–97:Q3) (53:Q2–82:Q4) (65:Q2–82:Q4)
Forecastability 2
α ′2 –1.021 (0.024)** –1.042 (0.034)** –1.028 (0.032)** –1.119 (0.100)**
γ ′2 –0.834 (0.035)** –0.810 (0.082)** –0.767 (0.049)** –0.656 (0.145)**
τ –0.073 (0.202) 0.392 (0.275) –0.036 (0.218) 0.167 (0.573)
σ 1 0.255 (0.032)** 0.291 (0.028)** 0.293 (0.037)** 0.433 (0.083)**
σ 2 0.852 (0.088)** 1.165 (0.184)** 0.949 (0.120)** 1.247 (0.340)**
R –2/D-W 0.90 / 1.70 0.79 / 1.68 0.88 / 1.82 0.73 / 1.77
[γ ′2 = α ′2 = –1]3 22.7 (0.000) 5.39 (0.067) 22.8 (0.000) 9.56 (0.008)
[γ ′2 = –1|α ′2 = –1] 22.3 (0.000) 3.79 (0.051) 22.7 (0.000) 5.13 (0.024)
Number of 
observations 85, 93 75, 55 60, 59 41, 30
(low, high)
Inflation level (59:Q3–97:Q3) (59:Q3–82:Q4)
α ′2 –1.029 (0.021)** –1.066 (0.037)** –1.010 (0.032)** –1.059 (0.055)**
γ ′2 –0.765 (0.051)** –0.838 (0.070)** –0.762 (0.050)** –0.802 (0.079)**
τ 0.493 (0.172)** 0.145 (0.144) 0.157 (0.222) –0.165 (0.177)
<5.65>4 <4.60> <4.99> <4.20>
σ 1 0.294 (0.021)** 0.259 (0.028)** 0.300 (0.032)** 0.239 (0.046)**
σ 2 1.078 (0.129)** 1.054 (0.105)** 1.002 (0.128)** 1.063 (0.116)**
R –2/D-W 0.90 / 1.75 0.80 / 1.67 0.88 / 1.83 0.75 / 1.75
[γ ′2 = α ′2 = –1] 21.1 (0.000) 5.77 (0.056) 24.2 (0.000) 6.33 (0.042)
[γ ′2 = –1|α ′2 = –1] 17.3 (0.000) 2.52 (0.113) 23.6 (0.000) 5.10 (0.024)
Number of 
observations 135, 43 100, 53 77, 42 47, 47
(low, high)
Notes: Estimation of equations (7) and (9) in first-difference form by MLE. The switching variable
is the forecastability index (upper panel) or lagged inflation (lower panel). Standard errors are in paren-
theses. The superscript ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. D-W denotes the Durbin-Watson statistic.
1For the tax-adjusted interest rate,a constant average marginal tax rate (θ =0.3) is assumed in columns
1 and 2, and the average marginal tax rate (θ t) from Sahasakul (1986) is used in columns 3 and 4.
2Measured from the monthly inflation forecast model that includes nine lags of the dependent
variable and the three-month treasury bill rate (two-period-lagged monthly figures).
3The Wald test for the null hypothesis is indicated within the square brackets (p-values are in
parentheses).
4The threshold value of the (annual) inflation rate (in percent, shown in angled brackets) is
converted from the τ estimate.castability index, where the evidence against linearity is rather weak (with a 9–16
percent significance level). The evidence against linearity becomes stronger with
the level of inflation as the switching variable: in particular, for the PPC, linearity
is rejected at the 5 percent level. Also, a specification test for parameter constancy
across given subsamples is performed as if the threshold estimate (τ reported in
Table 3) were the true value as in Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Choi (1999b).
The last column of Table 2 provides evidence against parameter constancy across
the subsamples. Measuring the after-tax real rate with the time-varying marginal
tax rate provides qualitatively the same results (not reported). Taken together,
these results give credence to a significant threshold effect in the relationship
between interest rates and inflation.
Switching Regressions with Smooth Transition
The switching regression with smooth transition defined by equations (7) and (10)
is estimated by MLE. Table 3 summarizes the results using a forecastability index
(upper panel) and, alternatively, using the inflation level (lower panel). The first
and second columns pertain to the tax rate adjustment with a constant marginal tax
rate, and the third and fourth columns pertain to that with a time-varying marginal
tax rate. The α ′2 estimate ranges from –1.12 to –1.01, whereas the γ ′2 estimate
ranges from –0.84 to –0.76, indicating that the reflection of inflation in the real
rate varies across regimes. The estimate of τ , for example, is –0.073 with the CPI
(0.392 with the PPC) when the forecastability index and constant marginal tax rate
are used: the observations for the high-forecastability regime are 93 out of 178 for
the CPI (55 out of 130 for the PPC). The estimates of σ 1 and σ 2 indicate that the
conditional variance of the real rate under the high-forecastability regime is about
three to four times as high as that under the other regime, consistent with the
assumption of regime-wide heteroskedasticity. 
The Wald test results run counter to the IFH when inflation forecastability is
above a threshold value. Specifically, in the upper panel of Table 3, the Wald test
strongly rejects the null hypothesis of γ ′2 = α ′2 = –1 in most cases, indicating that
the IFH does not hold for the whole sample. In addition, the Wald test rejects the
null hypothesis of γ ′2 = –1 given α ′2 = –1 at the 1 percent level for the CPI and
at about the 5 percent level for the PPC. Considering how close the α ′2 estimate
is to –1, these results suggest that the data do not support the IFH under the high-
forecastability regime. This finding is insensitive to the choice of the price vari-
able and marginal tax rate adjustment. The same implications can be drawn from
the results with the inflation level as the switching index (lower panel), although
the p-value of the Wald test for the null hypothesis of γ ′2 = –1 given α ′2 = –1 is
rather high (0.113) for the PPC. The threshold value for inflation ranges from 4
to 6 percent.
Switching Regressions with Perfect Discrimination
Table 4 reports the results of switching regressions with perfect discrimination,
which are estimated by WLS to account for heteroskedasticity, using the square
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ratio test statistic for a threshold effect, F1, is highly significant in all cases, as
shown by the p-values, strongly indicating a threshold effect. The samples are
perfectly discriminated according to the LS estimate of τ , which, however,
involves some degree of uncertainty as indicated by a confidence interval (90
percent) that is not very tight.13 With the inflation level as the switching index,
more observations tend to be assigned to the low-inflation regime.
The point estimate of α ′2 is very close to –1, and the t-value for α ′2 = –1 is too
low to reject the IFH under the low-forecastability regime. In contrast, the point
estimate of γ ′2 is less than 0.90 and the t-value for γ ′2 = –1 is greater than 2.8, indi-
cating that the IFH is rejected only under the high-forecastability regime. In addi-
tion, the IFH is rejected under the high-inflation regime but not under the
low-inflation regime (lower panel of Table 4). 
In sum, linearity tests provide the evidence of the threshold effect in
Carmichael and Stebbing’s regressions. The switching regression results indicate
that the IFH is supported by U.S. data only when inflation forecastability is below
an estimated threshold. The results are robust to the measurement of the price vari-
able, the marginal tax rate adjustment, and the switching index.
IV. Robustness Checks and Some Evidence for Other Countries
Robustness Checks
This section examines, first, whether the results are affected when the analysis
follows Carmichael and Stebbing’s timing convention that rNt is the after-tax
real return on a three-month treasury bill held from the beginning to the end
of quarter t. The interest rate should reflect inflation expectations over the life
of the bill. Since data for inflation do not pertain to a specific date in the
month, the underlying maturity cannot be exactly matched with the inflation
horizon. Also, the interest rate with this timing is subject to daily seasonality
(see, for example, Hamilton, 1997) as reserve requirements with the two-week
maintenance period affect the daily funds rate and thus other short-term rates.
For comparison purposes, switching regressions following the Carmichael and
Stebbing timing (with the CPI) are estimated.14 The starting date of regres-
sions (1962:Q3) is dictated by the availability of daily data for the three-month
treasury bill rate. As shown in Table 5, the results obtained using the fore-
castability index and the inflation level deliver the same message as those
shown in Tables 3 and 4.
We also examine whether accounting for shifts in institutional factors
affects the results. First, to account for financial deregulation in the early
1980s, we estimate the switching regression separately for the pre-deregulation
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13The plots of the likelihood ratio as a function of τ f indicate a unique major dip in the likelihood ratio
around the estimate, suggesting that two regimes are sufficient to describe the nature of the threshold effect. 
14To deal with the seasonality issue, we use the period-average rate of interest rather than the rate at
a specific date for quarter t, taking the rate of inflation as the period-average figure.THE INVERTED FISHER HYPOTHESIS
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Table 4. Switching Regressions with Perfect Discriminations
Constant Marginal Tax Rate1 Time-Varying Marginal Tax Rate1
CPI PPC CPI PPC
Parameter (53:Q2–97:Q3) (65:Q2–97:Q3) (53:Q2–82:Q4) (65:Q2–82:Q4)
Forecastability 2
F13 9.47 (0.047) 8.15 (0.067) 11.2 (0.017) 6.61 (0.136)
τ –0.168 0.230 –0.205 –0.386
[–0.600, 0.092]4 [–0.012, 0.689] [0.532, 0.671] [n.a.,5 0.907]
α ′2 –1.005 (0.032)** –1.036 (0.049)** –1.006 (0.040)** –1.107 (0.096)**
γ ′2 –0.877 (0.026)** –0.829 (0.054)** –0.833 (0.034)** –0.808 (0.066)**
R –2/D-W 0.92 / 1.54 0.83 / 1.54 0.91 / 1.64 0.80 / 1.65
t-value for α ′2 = –1 –0.15 (0.561) –0.74 (0.770) –0.15 (0.562) –1.11 (0.860)
t-value for γ ′2 = –1 4.68 (0.000) 3.16 (0.001) 4.98 (0.000) 2.89 (0.003)
Number of 
observations 78, 100 69, 61 47, 72 21, 50
(low, high)
Inflation level (59:Q3–97:Q3) (59:Q3–82:Q4)
F1 15.5 (0.000) 15.8 (0.004) 9.70 (0.028) 10.7 (0.025)
τ 0.018 <4.18>6 1.095 <7.06> –0.099 <4.03> 0.759 <7.04>
[–0.116, 0.542] [1.008, 1.257] [–0.510, 0.955] [0.690, 0.965]
α ′2 –0.989 (0.026)** –1.006 (0.034)** –0.974 (0.034)** –1.004 (0.049)**
γ ′2 –0.826 (0.032)** –0.644 (0.085)** –0.812 (0.039)** –0.651 (0.097)**
R –2/D-W 0.92 / 1.53 0.85 / 1.45 0.91 / 1.64 0.84 / 1.52
t-value for α ′2 = –1 0.42 (0.338) –0.19 (0.575) 0.75 (0.227) –0.09 (0.535)
t-value for γ ′2 = –1 5.31 (0.000) 4.19 (0.000) 4.75 (0.000) 3.60 (0.001)
Number of 
observations 114, 64 133, 20 68, 51 74, 20
(low, high)
Notes: Estimation of equation (7) in first-difference form by WLS. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. The superscript ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. D-W denotes the Durbin-Watson
statistic.
1For the tax-adjusted interest rate, a constant average marginal tax rate (θ = 0.3) is assumed in
the first and second columns, and the average marginal tax rate (θ t) from Sahasakul (1986) is used in
the third and fourth columns. 
2Measured from the monthly inflation forecast model that includes nine lags of the dependent
variable and the three-month treasury bill rate (two-period-lagged monthly figures).
3The likelihood-ratio test for the null hypothesis of no threshold effect. P-values in square
brackets are obtained from a bootstrap procedure with 1,000 replications of bootstrap samples,
following Hansen (1999).
4The 90 percent confidence interval for τ f is computed using the likelihood-ratio statistics
(Hansen, 1999). 
5The lower bound is not available (n.a.), since no statistics on τ < –0.386 are greater than its crit-
ical value. 
6The threshold value of the (annual) inflation rate (in percent, shown in angled brackets) is
converted from the τ estimate.(before 1980) and post-deregulation (after 1980) periods. Qualitatively the
same result is found from the post-deregulation period regression; similar
implications are obtained from the pre-deregulation period regression, in which
most observations belong to the low-forecastability regime, so that the result is
more favorable to the Carmichael and Stebbing argument. Second, to account
for price controls that affect inflation and possibly the interest rate setting, we
included a Korean War dummy (set to equal 1 for the years 1951–53) in the
inflation forecast equation. A step function taken from Gordon (1990), which
was designed to capture the effects of imposing and then eliminating price
controls during the Nixon era (1971–74), was also used. Using the resulting
forecastability measure has little effect on the results, as shown in the third
column of Table 5. Alternatively, the regressions were estimated leaving out the
Korean War period and the era of the Nixon price controls. The results are very
similar except that the cutoff value rises.
The forecastability index is alternatively measured with a quarterly inflation
regression that includes the three-month treasury bill rate and four lags of the
dependent variable, where the lag length of four for the CPI (PPC) is selected by
the information criteria of Akaike, Schwarz, and Hannan-Quinn (that of Akaike
and Hannan-Quinn criteria) that are described in Lütkepohl (1991). With this
alternative index, linearity tests gave similar results, and, as reported in the last
column of Table 5, switching regressions with the CPI provides qualitatively the
same results. Also, alternative window sizes (four or six years) or alternative
values of h provide similar results and support the main conclusion in most
cases. Further, the forecastability measure is largely consistent with Evans and
Wachtel’s (1993) result, obtained from a Markov switching model, that the prob-
ability of being in the random-walk state hovered near 100 percent in the late
1970s and did not fall appreciably until 1985.
To seek a more direct measure of inflation persistence, we estimate the
fractional difference process for inflation using a method from Phillips
(1998).15 Figure 5 depicts the fractional integration parameter (d) with two-
standard-error bands from the rolling estimation of the quarterly inflation
process (window size = 20) with the CPI and the PPC. The rolling estimate of
d for 1967–86 hovers close to a unit root (d = 1) or a nonstationary fractional
root (d > 0.5). The inflation process is stationary with short memory for the first
half of the 1960s and the most recent two years. It is marginally stationary but
with long memory (for example, d > 0.3) for some fraction of the other years,
although confidence intervals include some short-memory alternatives for the
second half of the 1980s. This measure, although less volatile, is largely consis-
tent with the inflation forecastability index, with a correlation coefficient of
0.40. Table 6 reports the regression results using the rolling estimate of d in
place of Ft. The results are similar to the main results. Specifically, the Wald
test results suggest that the IFH under high inflation persistence (d > 0.40 with
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15We consider the fractional difference process of the form (1 – L)d(π t – µ)=vt, where L is the lag
operator, d is the fractional integration parameter, and vt is a mean zero stationary error. This process is
stationary for |d| < 0.5.THE INVERTED FISHER HYPOTHESIS
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Table 5. Switching Regressions with Alternative Measures of Timing 
and Inflation Forecast
Carmichael and Stebbing Timing1 Inflation Forecast2
Forecastability Inflation Monthly forecast  Quarterly forecast 
Parameter index level with price controls model
(62:Q3–97:Q3) (62:Q3–97:Q3) (53:Q2–97:Q3) (53:Q2–97:Q3)
Smooth transition
α ′2 –0.987 (0.035)** –1.018 (0.034)** –1.025 (0.024)** –1.005 (0.035)**
γ ′2 –0.858 (0.033)** –0.788 (0.043)** –0.835 (0.034)** –0.851 (0.032)**
τ –0.533 (0.199) 0.087 (0.146) –0.122 (0.181) –0.112 (0.207)
σ 1 0.216 (0.056)** 0.217 (0.030)** 0.246 (0.030)** 0.461 (0.037)**
σ 2 0.801 (0.070)** 1.023 (0.109)** 0.836 (0.079)** 0.728 (0.067)**
R –2/D-W 0.88 / 1.75 0.89 / 1.71 0.90 / 1.70 0.90 / 1.73
[γ ′2 = α ′2 = –1] 3 25.3 (0.000) 24.8 (0.000) 24.5 (0.000) 26.5 (0.000)
[γ ′2 = –1|α ′2 = –1] 24.1 (0.000) 23.1 (0.000) 23.1 (0.000) 26.5 (0.000)
Number of 
observations 38, 103 93, 48 80, 98 83, 95
(low, high)
Perfect discrimination
F14 6.03 (0.148) 8.50 (0.052) 8.52 (0.075) 9.02 (0.037)
τ –0.363 0.320 <5.79>6 –0.097 0.330 
[–0.918, 0.598]5 [–0.703, 0.864] [–0.885, 0.303] [–0.242, 0.598]
α ′2 –1.031(0.059)** –0.969 (0.034)** –0.997 (0.031)** –0.983 (0.028)**
γ ′2 –0.873 (0.027)** –0.826 (0.035)** –0.877 (0.027)** –0.860 (0.030)**
R –2/D-W 0.91 / 1.65 0.91 / 1.63 0.92 / 1.53 0.92 / 1.53
t-value for α ′2 = –1 –0.53 (0.701) 0.91 (0.183) 0.09 (0.464) 0.60 (0.275)
t-value for γ ′2 = –1 4.67 (0.000) 4.90 (0.000) 4.58 (0.000) 4.59 (0.000)
Number of 
observations 53, 88 100, 41 82, 96 96, 82
(low, high)
Notes: Regressions in first-difference form with the CPI, assuming θ = 0.3. Equations (7) and
(9) are estimated by MLE (upper panel), and equation (7) with perfect discrimination is estimated by
WLS (lower panel). Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscript ** denotes significance at the
0.01 level. D-W denotes the Durbin-Watson statistic.
1The interest rate is the yield on the first business day of a quarter (available from 1962:Q3), and
inflation (π t+1) is the annualized rate in the last month of quarter t. The switching variable is the last
month’s value in each quarter from the monthly forecastability index, and the inflation level is the
last month’s inflation in quarter t–1.
2The monthly forecast model includes nine lags of the dependent variable, the three-month trea-
sury bill rate (two-month-lagged figures), a dummy variable for the Korean War period, and a step
function for the Nixon-era price controls (Gordon, 1990). The quarterly forecast model includes four
lags of the dependent variable and the one-quarter-lagged three-month treasury bill rate (h = 0.72). 
3The Wald test for the null hypothesis is indicated within the square brackets (p-values are in
parentheses).
4The likelihood-ratio test for the null hypothesis of no threshold effect. P-values in square
brackets are obtained from a bootstrap procedure with 1,000 replications of bootstrap samples,
following Hansen (1999).
5The 90 percent confidence interval for τ f is computed using the likelihood-ratio statistics
(Hansen, 1999).
6The threshold value of the (annual) inflation rate (in percent, shown in angled brackets) is converted
from the τ estimate.the CPI and d > 0.54 with the PPC) is strongly rejected with the CPI but weakly
rejected with the PPC. When the perfect discrimination scheme is employed,
for both the CPI and the PPC, the IFH under high inflation persistence
(γ ′2 = –1) is strongly rejected, whereas the IFH under low inflation persistence
(α ′2 = –1) is not rejected.
Further, we also estimate directly the nominal rate equation iNt =α 0+α 1π t+1 +ξ t,
in which α 1 = 0 should hold under the IFH. The estimated results suggest that α 1 =0
is not rejected under the low-forecastability regime but strongly rejected under the
high-forecastability regime, robust to the choice of the switching index, consistent
with the results obtained using equation (7).
Finally, the sensitivity of the results to serial correlation in the residual was
checked. The single-regime regression results are affected little by the use of
MLE, allowing for serial correlation, or by the Newey-West correction for serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity. Unfortunately, if there is serial correlation in
the errors, existing procedures are not readily applicable to linearity testing and
statistical inference for a threshold parameter. Nonetheless, equations (7) and (10)
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Figure 5. Rolling Estimate of the Fractional Integration Parameter 
for Quarterly Inflation, 1953:Q2–1997:Q4
Note: Dashed lines represent two-standard-error bands.Goldfeld and Quandt (1972, pp. 258–77). Table 7 shows that this procedure yields
strong evidence for this study’s argument regarding the IFH, although the signifi-
cance level is rather higher. The serial correlation estimate is around 0.5 under the
low-forecastability (inflation) regime and nil under the other regime, perhaps indi-
cating a threshold effect in serial correlation as well. Also, since the WLS point
estimates under the perfect discrimination scheme are consistent, the t-test with
the Newey-West correction was applied for the IFH under alternative regimes.
Again, the results are little affected. 
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Table 6. Switching Regressions with Fractional Root Estimate 




α ′2 –1.090 (0.020)** –1.021 (0.033)**
γ ′2 –0.824 (0.028)** –0.871 (0.068)**
τ <d>1 –0.351 (0.157)* <0.396> 0.051 (0.347) <0.543>
σ 1 0.145 (0.023)** 0.311 (0.034)**
σ 2 0.752 (0.058)** 0.993 (0.150)**
R –2/D-W 0.90 / 1.73 0.79 / 1.68
[γ ′2 = α ′2 = –1] 2 50.8 (0.000) 3.77 (0.152)
[γ ′2 = –1|α ′2 = –1] 21.8 (0.000) 3.38 (0.066)
Number of observations (low, high) 63, 115 68, 67
Perfect discrimination
F13 19.1 (0.001) 10.8 (0.017)
τ <d> 0.350  <0.600> 0.633 <0.711>
[0.251, 0.701]4 [0.393, 0.941]
α ′2 –1.000 (0.026)** –1.021 (0.042)**
γ ′2 –0.824 (0.031)** –0.774 (0.063)**
R –2/D-W 0.93 / 1.52 0.83 / 1.55
t-value for α ′2 = –1 –0.01 (0.504) –0.50 (0.691)
t-value for γ ′2 = –1 5.67 (0.000) 3.61 (0.000)
Number of observations (low, high) 110, 68 88, 47
Notes: Equations (7) and (9) are estimated by MLE (upper panel), and equation (7) with perfect
discrimination is estimated by WLS (lower panel). A constant average marginal tax rate (θ = 0.3) is
assumed. The switching variable is the rolling estimate of the fractional root of an inflation process
(Phillips, 1998). Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts ** and * denote significance at
the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. D-W denotes the Durbin-Watson statistic.
1The threshold value of d (in angled brackets) is converted from the τ estimate. 
2The Wald test for the null hypothesis is indicated within the square brackets (p-values are in
parentheses).
3The likelihood-ratio test for the null hypothesis of no threshold effect. P-values in square
brackets are obtained from a bootstrap procedure with 1,000 replications of bootstrap samples,
following Hansen (1999).
4The 90 percent confidence interval for τ f is computed using the likelihood-ratio statistics
(Hansen, 1999).IFH Tests for Germany, Argentina, and Brazil
The IFH is tested for three countries with different inflation processes. Consider first
a low-inflation economy with significant regulation on money. During the
1958:Q1–1997:Q4 period, Germany has experienced low inflation (between –1.3
and 8.5 percent a year) and this inflation showed no remarkable persistence. We find
that linearity testing provides no evidence for nonlinearity in the Carmichael and
Stebbing equation and that the IFH is not rejected for the whole sample period. 
Next, consider two economies that shifted from high inflation to low inflation.
Argentina experienced high inflation before 1991 (which averaged about 88
percent in the 1970s and 237 percent for 1980:Q1–1990:Q4) and single digit infla-
tion rates since 1991 with the adoption of a hard currency link to the dollar (a
currency board). Brazil also experienced high inflation (252 percent for
1980:Q2–1994:Q3) and single-digit inflation rates since 1997. In both countries,
interest rates show excessive sensitivity to inflation changes when inflation rises
sharply during the 1980s (which results in a sharp changes in the real rate). We
exclude the samples with excessive real interest rate changes—by more than 2000
percent (200 percent) per annum for Argentina (Brazil)—for the 1979:Q3
(1980:Q3)–2000:Q3 period, the starting period of which is dictated by the avail-
ability of the interest rate (inflation) series. 
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Table 7. Switching Regressions with Serial Correlation
Switching Index
Forecastability Forecastability Fractional root Inflation level
Parameter (53:Q2–97:Q3) (53:Q2–82:Q4) (53:Q2–97:Q3) (53:Q2–97:Q3)
α ′2 –1.027 (0.016)** –1.042 (0.024)** –1.057 (0.012)** –1.035 (0.019)**
γ ′2 –0.893 (0.036)** –0.820 (0.049)** –0.843 (0.036)** –0.786 (0.047)**
τ 0.182 (0.145) 0.104 (0.183) –0.140 (0.143) 0.341 (0.194)
< 0.539>1 <5.16>1
σ 1 0.228 (0.022)** 0.261 (0.033)** 0.143 (0.015)** 0.249 (0.028)**
σ 2 0.951 (0.097)** 0.988 (0.122)** 0.906 (0.088)** 1.008 (0.119)**
ϕ 12 0.572 (0.091)** 0.471 (0.125)** 0.715 (0.090)** 0.451 (0.096)**
ϕ 22 0.029 (0.118) –0.037 (0.151) –0.124 (0.132) –0.088 (0.141)
R –2 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.90
[γ ′2 = α ′2 = –1]3 8.92 (0.012) 13.5 (0.001) 30.6 (0.000) 20.8 (0.000)
[γ ′2 = –1|α ′2 = –1] 5.96 (0.015) 10.4 (0.001) 6.83 (0.009) 15.0 (0.000)
Number of observations
(low, high) 103, 74 62, 56 86, 91 129, 48
Notes: Regressions in the first-difference form with the CPI. Switching regressions with smooth
transition are estimated by MLE. A constant average marginal tax rate (θ = 0.3) is assumed for the
first, third, and fourth columns, and a time-varying marginal tax rate is assumed for the fourth
column. Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscript ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. 
1The threshold value of d or inflation (in angled brackets) is converted from the τ estimate. 
2The serial correlation coefficients are ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 under the low-forecastability (persistence of
inflation) regime and the high-forecastability (persistence of inflation) regime, respectively.
3The Wald test for the null hypothesis is indicated within the square brackets (p-values are in
parentheses).Table 8 reports the results of linearity test and switching regressions with
perfect discrimination. Linearity in the Carmichael and Stebbing equation is
rejected for both countries, although less significantly under the heteroskedas-
ticity assumption for Argentina. Using the rolling estimate of the fractional
root (or the inflation level) as the switching index, the result suggests that the
IFH is supported by the data for Argentina only when inflation persistence is
below a certain threshold. Using the inflation level as the switching index to
include most samples during the 1980s in the regression, the result suggests
that the IFH is supported by the data for Brazil if inflation is below a certain
threshold but not otherwise. The excessive sensitivity of interest rates to
accelerated inflation in Argentina and Brazil suggests that there can be another
regime of very high inflation in which the real rate responds positively to
inflation changes.
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Table 8. Switching Regressions for Argentina and Brazil
Parameter/ Argentina Brazil
Test Statistics (1979:Q3–2000:Q3) (1980:Q3–2000:Q3)
SupLM AveLM ExpLM SupLM AveLM ExpLM 
7.58 (0.021) 3.26 (0.099) 2.29 (0.051) 3.74 (0.093) 2.58 (0.122) 1.38 (0.110)
Linearity test statistics1 4.87 (0.088) 2.58 (0.172) 1.47 (0.148) 3.80 (0.059) 3.06 (0.051) 1.58 (0.052)
F12 10.9 (0.108) 12.4 (0.082)
τ <d>3 0.533 <0.643>3 0.172 <84.3>3
[0.509, 1.126]4 [–0.210, 0.865]
α ′2 –1.343 (0.393)** –0.933 (0.197)**
γ ′2 –0.062 (0.193)  0.134 (0.238)
R –2 0.13 0.27
t-value for α ′2 = –1 –1.24 (0.890) 0.34 (0.368)
t-value for γ ′2 = –1 4.86 (0.000) 4.76 (0.000)
Number of observations 
(low, high) 52, 27 35, 18
Notes: Equation (7) in a first-difference form including an intercept under perfect discrimination is
estimated by WLS, assuming θ = 0. Inflation and interest rates are measured by the quarterly CPI
(seasonally adjusted) and money market rates, respectively (data source: IMF, International Financial
Statistics (Washington), various issues). The switching variable is the rolling estimate of the fractional
root of an inflation process for Argentina and the lagged inflation level for Brazil. Standard errors are
in parentheses. The superscript ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
1Figures in the upper row (lower row) for each statistic are based on the homoskedasticity
(heteroskedasticity) assumption. The asymptotic p-values (in parentheses) for SupLM, AveLM, and
ExpLM are computed from simulations (J = 1,000) over the grid set (#Γ = 102). 
2The likelihood-ratio test for the null hypothesis of no threshold effect. P-values in square
brackets are obtained from a bootstrap procedure with 1,000 replications of bootstrap samples,
following Hansen (1999).
3The threshold value of d (in angled brackets) is converted from the τ estimate. 
4The 90 percent confidence interval for τ f is computed using the likelihood-ratio statistics
(Hansen, 1999). V. Related Studies and Discussions
Related Recent Studies on Testing the (Standard) Fisher Hypothesis
Crowder and Hoffman (1996) suggest the validity of the Fisher hypothesis on the
basis of a long-run relationship between the nominal interest rate and inflation. King
and Watson (1997), however, suggest that the evidence about the Fisher equation over
their entire period is inconclusive, showing that their results support the Fisher
hypothesis for only a range of certain identifying restrictions. Mishkin (1992) finds
that empirical evidence supports the existence of a long-run Fisher effect only during
periods of high inflation when inflation and interest rates exhibit trends.16 In a similar
vein, Barsky (1987) and Hutchison and Keeley (1989) show the presence of a strong
Fisher effect under monetary regimes with high inflation forecastability. These results
on the Fisher hypothesis or equation reconcile the current study’s finding that the IFH
is not supported under a regime with high inflation forecastability.
Forecastability and Uncertainty
Inflation tends to be positively related to short-term inflation forecastability (or
persistence): for example, based on the CPI, the correlation between the forecasta-
bility index (rolling estimate of fractional root) and lagged inflation is 0.51 (0.57).
Friedman (1977) suggests that high inflation leads to greater inflation uncertainty.
As Ball and Cecchetti (1990) point out, however, the inflation-uncertainty link
depends on the forecast horizon. Indeed, high inflation owing to policy under a fidu-
ciary monetary system raises long-term uncertainty but may make it easier to predict
short-term inflation, as argued by Klein (1975). High inflation in the United States
during the 1970s and early 1980s raises the variability of inflation (or long-term
inflation uncertainty).17 Recall that our forecastability measure is inversely related to
the ratio of short-term to long-term uncertainty. It is highly plausible that long-term
uncertainty outweighs short-term uncertainty during high-inflation periods and,
hence, that inflation is positively related to inflation forecastability.
Direct Effects of Inflation Uncertainty on Interest Rates
An existing strand of the literature examines the direct effect of inflation uncertainty
on interest rates. For example, Lahiri, Teigland, and Zaporowski (1988) regress
interest rates on the moments of the probability distribution of forecasts constructed
from the American Statistical Association—National Bureau of Economic Research
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16As noted by King and Watson (1997), Mishkin (1992) and Evans and Lewis (1995) find that
nominal rates do not respond fully to permanent changes in inflation and attribute this to a small-sample
bias associated with shifts in the inflation process.
17Fischer (1981) argues that high inflation raises the variability, but not necessarily the uncertainty,
of inflation. According to Ball and Cecchetti (1990), inflation uncertainty pertains to the variance of unan-
ticipated inflation, whereas inflation variability pertains to the variance of inflation. Since high inflation
tends to be largely anticipated, unanticipated inflation will not be large relative to inflation, supporting
Fischer’s argument. Also, Ball and Cecchetti show that inflation has much larger positive effects on infla-
tion uncertainty at long horizons.survey of the implicit GNP deflator. Others (for example, Makin, 1983) do so on the
semiannual Livingston uncertainty (or disagreement) measure, computed as the stan-
dard deviation of the inflation forecasts of respondents to the Livingston survey. In
contrast, the present study examines how the link between interest rates and inflation
is altered by inflation forecastability (persistence) with a threshold effect.
Link Between Inflation Level and Inflation Effect on Interest Rates
Azariadis and Smith (1998) suggest a threshold effect in the relation between infla-
tion and returns. Since real balances and bank deposits are substitutes in households’
portfolios, the zero nominal return on real balances anchors the rate of return on bank
deposits. In a low-inflation economy in which credit is not rationed, an increase in
inflation leads to lower real rates (and a higher capital-output ratio).18 Conversely, in
a high-inflation economy in which credit must be rationed, an increase in inflation
leads to a smaller capital stock. Thus, whether or not the economy has credit rationing
is crucial for the link of the inflation level to the inflation effect on returns. Also, its
assumption of a constant implicit real rate of return on real balances anchors the
nominal rate. Using cross-country data, Barnes, Boyd, and Smith (1999) find that
inflation and nominal rates are only weakly positively correlated for low-to-
moderate-inflation economies, whereas inflation has a positive effect on nominal
rates for high-inflation economies. This line of research reconciles our framework, in
that asset substitutability is emphasized. Our framework, however, emphasizes the
link between the inflation process and asset substitutions, assuming that the implicit
real returns to real balances rise with inflation if inflation is persistent. 
Inflation Forecastability and Inflation Level
On the one hand, this study argues that the relative importance of the substi-
tutability between money and bonds and that between nominal assets and capital
varies with inflation forecastability (or persistence). On the other hand, defining
the switching variable by the inflation level is motivated by the possibility of
varying substitutability over regimes. The estimated results reconcile both
approaches and do not distinguish one from the other, given that high inflation is
highly correlated with the persistence of inflation.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The IFH, strongly supported by Carmichael and Stebbing’s finding using U.S. data
for 1953–78, was confirmed later by Gupta’s (1991) finding for 1968–85. Barth and
Bradley (1988), however, report that the hypothesis no longer holds when samples are
extended beyond 1978. They attribute this reversal to the crucial dependence of the
hypothesis on relatively stable inflation (and moderate regulatory changes), but they
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18This is similar to the Mundell-Tobin effect that represents a portfolio-substitution effect of inflation on
the steady-state capital-labor ratio. The Mundell-Tobin effect, however, assumes that real balances and capital
are substitutes (direct financing for capital investments) so that an increase in inflation increases the portfolio
demand for capital and thus the capital-labor ratio, which, in turn, lowers the real rate of return on assets.do not directly test the effect of inflation or its persistence. The current study finds
that the estimation of equation (3′ ) using quarterly U.S. data for 1953–97 lends little
support to the IFH. 
These results, however, do not imply a complete rejection of the IFH, since
support for the hypothesis depends on inflation persistence. Agents can largely fore-
cast changes in inflation during persistently inflationary periods, and asset substitu-
tions brought about by such changes alter the implicit marginal return on money and,
hence, the nominal rate. As a result, the IFH will receive less support from the entire
sample, which includes persistently inflationary periods. Taking into account that the
reflection of inflation in interest rates varies with inflation forecastability, this
study’s analyses with U.S. data reject linearity in the Carmichael and Stebbing equa-
tion and provide new evidence that the IFH is supported only if inflation forecasta-
bility is below a certain threshold. Further, our argument for the validity of the IFH
is also consistent with the results obtained for Germany, Argentina, and Brazil.
This study provides policy implications as follows. A discretionary monetary
policy results in an inflation bias, which tends to involve persistence in inflation.
To reduce the inflation bias, the central bank may adopt inflation targeting (with a
Taylor-type policy rule) or exchange rate targeting, both of which will reduce
inflation persistence and increase credibility. Also, emphasis on reputations by
central bankers will lead the economy to a less persistent or low-inflation equilib-
rium. Thus, credibility and reputation is (inversely) related to inflation persis-
tence.19 Shifts in monetary regimes can alter the nature of the nominal anchor, as
emphasized by Flood and Mussa (1994). A regime shift towards less persistent
inflation or more stable prices may favor the IFH. Further, suppose that economic
activities are sensitive to changes in the real interest rate. Then the one-for-one
inverse relationship between real interest rate and inflation (that is, the validity of
the IFH) reconciles a trade-off between inflation and unemployment that becomes
weak when a discretionary monetary policy makes inflation persistent.
APPENDIX I. Linearity Testing
Equation (7) in a difference form can be rewritten for testing linearity:
Testing the null hypothesis of α ′2 = γ ′2 proceeds in the following steps, as in Granger and
Teräsvirta (1993). First, run the following regression by least squares (LS) ∆ rNt = β∆π t+1 + et;
then compute the residual (e ˆt = ∆ rNt – βˆ∆π t+1) and the sum of squared residuals SSR0 = Σ e ˆt
2.
Next run the following regression by LS: e ˆt
* = δ∆π t
*
+1 + λDt∆π t
*
+1 + ςt, where e ˆt





+1 = π t+1/√g
–––
t and, given τ , Dt is defined by equation (7). Define gt = 1 if homoskedastic error
is assumed, and gt = it–1 if heteroskedastic error is assumed. Compute SSR1 = Σ ς ˆt
2. Finally,
compute the test statistic LM = T(SSR0 – SSR1)/SSR0, where T is the number of observations. 
∆∆ ∆ rD D D Nt t t t t t t t   = ′ + ′ − ′ ()+− () + ++ απ γ α π η η 21 22 1 1 2 1.
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19The change points of inflation persistence can also be related to shifts in the Fed’s operating mech-
anism (see, for the Fed’s operating mechanism, Choi, 1999a). In particular, the nonborrowed reserve
targeting for 1979:10–1982:10, which involves high and volatile money growth, matches the persistent
inflation regime, whereas federal funds rate targeting since 1987 matches the nonpersistent inflation
regime. (Under the Bretton Woods system and before the Vietnam War, interest rates were the focus of
monetary policy and inflation persistence was low.) Following Hansen (1996), J realizations of the LM statistics are generated for each grid in
the grid set Γ. We generate (ω
j
t, t=1,...T) i.i.d. N(0,1) random variables; under the assumption
of homoskedastic error, generate ∆ r ˜j
Nt = βˆ∆π t+1 + ω
j
tσ ˆe, where σ ˆe is the standard deviation of
e ˆt; or, under the assumption of heteroskedastic error, generate ∆ r ˜j





where σ ˆg is the standard deviation of gt; and the steps in the preceding paragraph are repeated
for j = 1, ..., J over Γ. Then we construct empirical distributions for three functionals of the
collection of the statistics 
where #Γ is the number of grid points in Γ.
APPENDIX II. Estimating Switching Regressions with Perfect Discrimination
The switching regression with perfect discrimination in a difference form is given by 
where ∆ r*
Nt = ∆ r*
Nt/√g
–––
t;  π t
*
+1 = π t+1/√g
–––
t; I(•) is an indicator function; and gt = it–1. As in
Hansen (1999, 2000), testing and estimating of the threshold model proceed as follows.  First,
the regression, ∆ r*
Nt = α ′2∆π *
t +u t, is run by LS, and the residual u ˜t = ∆ r*
Nt – α˜′2∆π *
t+1 and the
sum of squared residuals S0 = Σu ˜t
2 are computed. Next, for any given τ , the slope coefficient is
estimated by LS. Compute u ˆt
*(τ ) = ∆ r*
Nt – αˆ′2∆π *
t+1 ⋅ I(Ft ≤τ ) and S1(τ ) = Σu ˆt
*(τ ). The LS estimate
of τ is given by τˆ = arg
τ∈Γmin S1(τ ). Then, the likelihood-ratio test for the null hypothesis of no
threshold effect is based on F1 =( T–1)[S0–S1(τˆ)]/S1(τˆ). P-values for F1 are constructed by a
bootstrap procedure (Hansen, 1996, 1999). Finally, to test the null hypothesis of τ = τ 0,
construct the likelihood-ratio statistic to reject for large values of LR1(τ 0), where
LR1(τ )=( T–1)[S1(τ )–S1(τˆ)]/S1(τˆ). The no-rejection region of τ at confidence level 1–α is
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